The understanding of international war, like many complex social events, may be -and has been -approached from a range of theoretical perspectives and via a variety of research strategies. Outside of the work of Bloch (1898), Sorokin (1936), Richardson (1941), and Wright (1942), however, there was little research of a scientific nature until the mid-1960s. And while these past fifteen years have certainly not given us a compelling theory of international war, they have seen a steady growth in cumulative knowledge regarding the correlates of war. These results, despite the expected mix of inconsistencies and anomalies, provide us with some sense of the factors that are most consistently associated with war over the last century and a half, along with some tentative insights into the rising and declining potency of these factors.
). Nations with a dazzling variety of political, economic, and social institutions and practices are found in fairly equal numbers in the high and the low war frequency categories; nor does there seem to be a discernible trend over time. The only consistent finding is the obvious one that the more powerful are the more war-prone (Bremer 1980 (Holsti 1979) , interests, and needs (Choucri and North 1975) , including, of course, their own. As our research moves away from goodness of fit criteria to the confirmation of increasingly explanatory models, we will want to return to other domestic variables (as in M.
Haas 1965), but in the work proposed here we will restrict ourselves to that of military and industrial capabilities.
Shifting to the dyadic level of aggregation, Similarly, we and others have found that the properties of the international system help to account for the incidence of war (Garnham 1979; Sullivan 1978 (Singer 1979 (Kegley 1979 Organski's (1968) (Simon 1969 (George 1971 
